With respect to Avner Greif's article on this week's readings, how do you have trade without a reliable system of law? How effective are substitutes for law at enabling trade? And what are the consequences of developing a legal system that provides a secure umbrella for the protection of property rights and the enforcement of contracts?
Readings for January 28, 2009:
Avner Greif (1989), "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders," Journal of Economic History 49:4 (December), pp. 857-882 http://tinyurl.com/dl20090112g
Jan de Vries (1994), "The Industrious Revolution and the Industrial Revolution," Journal of Economic History 54:2 (June), pp. 249-70 http://tinyurl.com/dl20090112i
Jan de Vries (1994), "How did Pre-Industrial Labour Markets Function?" in George Grantham and Mary McKinnon, eds, Labour Market Evolution (London, Routledge, 1994), pp. 39-63. On reserve at Haas. January 14, 2009
Karl Marx (1867), Capital, "Part VIII: Primitive Accumulation," chapters 26-32 http://tinyurl.com/dl20090112k
Jan de Vries, "The Limits to Globalization in the Early Modern World," Economic History Review (forthcoming). On reserve at Haas.