Liveblogging World War II: June 22, 1944: Operation Bagration
Operation Bagration - Wikipedia:
Operation Bagration (/bʌɡrʌtiˈɒn/; Russian: Oперация Багратион, Operatsiya Bagration) was the codename for the Soviet 1944 Belorussian Strategic Offensive Operation during World War II, which cleared German forces from the Belorussian SSR and eastern Poland between 22 June and 19 August 1944. The operation was named after 18th–19th century Georgian Prince Pyotr Bagration, general of the Imperial Russian Army who was mortally wounded at the Battle of Borodino.
The operation resulted in the almost complete destruction of an entire German army group, with the loss of Army Group Centre's Fourth Army, Third Panzer Army and Ninth Army. It is considered the most calamitous defeat experienced by the German armed forces during the Second World War. By the end of the operation most of the western Soviet Union had been liberated and the Red Army had achieved footholds in Romania and Poland. German losses eventually numbered well over half a million men killed or wounded, even higher than the toll at Verdun in 1916.
The Soviet armies directly involved in Operation Bagration were the 1st Baltic Front under Army General Ivan Bagramyan, the 1st Belorussian Front commanded by Army General Konstantin Rokossovsky, the 2nd Belorussian Front commanded by Colonel-General G. F. Zakharov, and the 3rd Belorussian Front commanded by Colonel-General Ivan Chernyakhovsky.... The Red Army practiced the concept of Soviet deep battle and maskirovka....
Army Group Centre had previously proved tough to counter as the Soviet defeat in Operation Mars had shown. But by June 1944, despite shortening its front line, it had been exposed following the withdrawals of Army Group South.... Operation Suvorov had seen Army Group Centre itself forced to retreat westwards from Smolensk during the autumn of 1943.... Hitler underestimated the threat posed by Soviet troops facing Army Group Centre, and had redeployed ⅓ of Army Group Centre's artillery, ½ their tank destroyers and 88% of their tanks to the Southern front where the German high command expected the next major Soviet offensive. Army Group center only had a total of 580 tanks, tank-destroyers and assault guns. They were opposed by over 9000 Soviet machines. The redeployment of forces from Army Group Center left only 80 men defending every kilometer of the front line....
The battle has been described as the triumph of the Soviet theory of "the operational art" because of the complete co-ordination of all the Strategic Front movements and signals traffic to fool the enemy about the target of the offensive. The military tactical operations of the Red Army successfully avoided the mobile reserves of the Wehrmacht and continually "wrong-footed" the German forces. Despite the huge forces involved, Soviet front commanders left their adversaries completely confused about the main axis of attack until it was too late....
The Soviets left four tank armies in the L'vov-Peremyshl area and allowed the Germans to know it. The attack into Romania in April–June... kept the Germans concerned about their defences there and in southern Poland....
Towards the beginning of June the German High Command, Army Group Center and the Army Commands had identified a large part of the concentration against Army Group Centre, although it was still considered that the main operation would be against Army Group North Ukraine. On 14 June the Chief of Staff of Army Group Centre said to General Kurt Zeitzler that:
the Russian concentration here [in front of 9th Army] and at the Autobahn clearly indicates that the enemy attack will be aimed at the wings of the Army Group
On 10 June the OKH took over the opinion of Army Group Centre in its estimate of the enemy situation:
When it is still to be considered that the attack against Army Group Centre will be a secondary operation in the framework of the global Soviet offensive operations, it must be taken into account that the enemy will also be capable in front of Army Group Centre to build concentrations of which the force of penetration cannot be underestimated in view of the ratio of forces between the two sides....
The Stavka had committed approximately 1,700,000 combat and support troopers, approximately 24,000 artillery pieces and mortars, 4,080 tanks and assault guns and 6,334 aircraft. German strength was approximately 800,000 combat and support troopers and 9,500 artillery pieces but only 553 tanks and assault guns and 839 aircraft....
Operation Bagration began on 22 June 1944, the same calendar day on which the Germans had previously invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, with probing attacks throughout the German lines. The main offensive began in the early morning of 23 June, with an artillery bombardment of unprecedented scale against the defensive works. Within hours, some sectors of the German defenses were in danger of being breached. The first phase of Soviet deep operations, the "deep battle" envisaged breaking through the tactical zones and forward German defences. Once these tactical offensives had been successful, fresh operational reserves exploited the breakthrough and the operational depths of the enemy front using powerful mechanized and armoured formations to encircle enemy concentrations on an Army Group Scale....
Vitebsk–Orsha Offensive: The operation was conducted by the 1st Baltic Front and 3rd Belorussian Front... the 1st Baltic Front pushed the IX corps over the Dvina, while encircling the LIII Corps in the city of Vitebsk by 25 June. To the south, the 3rd Belorussian Front drove through the VI Corps, shattering it. Vitebsk was taken by 27 June, the entire LIII Corps of 30,000 men being destroyed. The 3rd Belorussian Front simultaneously opened operations against Fourth Army's XXVII Corps.... Orsha was liberated by 26 June, and the 3rd Belorussian Front's mechanized forces were able to penetrate far into the German rear, reaching the Berezina River by 28 June.
Mogilev Offensive: The primary aim of the Mogilev Offensive, and of the 2nd Belorussian Front, was to pin down the majority of Fourth Army while the developing Vitebsk-Orsha and Bobruysk Offensives encircled it. The 2nd Belorussian Front's units attacked on 23 June.... The Dnepr was crossed by the 49th Army by 27 June, and by 28 June it had encircled and taken the town of Mogilev. The XXXIX Panzer Corps and XII Corps began to fall back towards the Berezina River under heavy air attack, but were retreating into a trap....
The Bobruysk Offensive, against Ninth Army on the southern flank of Army Group Centre, was opened by the 1st Belorussian Front on 23 June, but suffered heavy losses attempting to penetrate the German defenses. Rokossovsky ordered additional bombing and artillery preparation, and launched further attacks the next day. The 3rd Army broke through in the north of the sector, trapping the German XXXV Corps against the Berezina. The 65th Army then broke through the XXXXI Panzer Corps to the south; by 27 June, the two German corps were encircled in a pocket east of Bobruysk under constant aerial bombardment...
