Liveblogging World War I: September 13, 1941: The Battle of the Marne: Conclusion
From Sewell Tyng: The Campaign of the Marne:
Despite minor frictions, the German armies at last arrived upon the positions which they were destined to hold without substantial change until the spring of 1918; but Von Moltke had still to drain the dregs of his cup of humiliation, for this day was his last as Chief of the German General Staff. At the suggestion, it is said, of the younger officers of von Moltke's own Operations Section who had lost all confidence in their chief, and impelled by the officers of the Imperial military household, the Emperor summoned von Moltke and informed him that the state of his health was too precarious for the heavy responsibilities devolving upon him. The same day von Falkenhayn, the Prussian Minister of War, assumed the duties of the Chief of the General Staff, and von Stein, superseded by von Freytag-Loringhoven as Quartermaster-General, was sent to command an army corps.
To avoid the unfavourable comment and criticism which a summary removal of the Chief of Staff immediately following a general retreat would inevitably have provoked, von Moltke retained his title for several weeks before von Falkenhayn formally succeeded him, remaining however a mere figure-head, in the role of a spectator, where he had formerly exerted supreme authority. At last, on November 1st, von Moltke left the field Headquarters of the German armies forever.
THE German armies retreated from the battlefield of the Marne practically unmolested, in many cases unperceived by their opponents, and were able to settle down upon their new positions before the main bodies of the Allied armies could resume contact. In efforts to explain the Allies' failure to exploit the victory so dearly bought to its fullest extent, many reasons have been assigned : the weather, which changed on September 9th from clear and hot to cold and rainy, the exhaustion of stocks of munitions, the destruction of bridges across the Marne and other streams, and the congested conditions of the roads; but though all these no doubt contributed in some degree, the most important single cause lay in the condition of the victorious troops themselves. A natural reaction from the fatigue of a long retreat, followed by days of battle fought under highest tension, made them incapable of greater effort. It was not the will, but the physical strength that lacked, and orders from the High Command, however peremptory or inspiring, could not supply it.... The responsibility for the failure of the Allies to obtain benefits corresponding to the magnitude of their strategical victory rests primarily, however, at the door of the British and of Conneau's French Cavalry Corps, for they, above all, failed to profit by their opportunities....
Material or physical disadvantages likewise played a major part in the collapse of the German strategical scheme. In the first place, the logic of numbers was against them. Along the main battle-front, from Paris to the Swiss border, the Allies engaged 13 cavalry divisions against 9 German cavalry divisions, 54½ Active infantry divisions against 42½ Active German infantry divisions, and 21½ Reserve divisions against 26 German Reserve and Ersatz divisions—a total of 76 infantry divisions against 68½. Even allowing for the greater youth and superior military training of the German troops, this discrepancy, which was accentuated by the replacements the French units had received from their depots, constituted a heavy burden. Hardly less important was the lack of transportation facilities. Operating far within a hostile country, across which the retreating Allies had, so far as possible, destroyed or impeded roads, railways, bridges and means of communication, the German armies found themselves many miles from their principal rail-heads with no transversal lines behind their front, and with no means, except by road, to bring forward reinforcements, munitions or supplies. Even had von Moltke desired to reinforce his right wing armies by withdrawals from his left, he could have done so only by the circuitous route of Aix-la-Chapelle, while Joffre had unimpeded use of a number of railway lines. In granting the Allies full credit for the skill displayed in the use of the facilities of transportation and communication at their command, it must not be forgotten that the advantage they derived was proportionately increased from the fact that the Germans could only improvise or do without such facilities.
In seeking the explanation for the outcome of the Campaign of the Marne, one cannot look solely to short-comings on the German side, or to disabilities under which the invading armies laboured, important as these undoubtedly were. Once the Battle of the Frontiers had ended, Joffre conducted the retreat and the regrouping of the Allied armies with an ability that rarely has been rivalled in military history. The end of the retreat and the beginning of the Allied offensive came, not as the result of any lightning stroke of genius by one of his subordinates, but after a deliberate survey of the whole situation had convinced him that no better opportunity would be likely to offer, and after a careful appraisal of the strength of his own forces and of the ability of his ally to co-operate gave him reasonable hope of victory.... Neither were the positions of the opposing forces when the battle opened merely the result of a fortuitious combination of circumstances. They were rather the logical outcome of the German plan of operations and of the dispositions taken by the French Commander in Chief to counteract it: the manoeuvre in retreat, the formation of Maunoury's Army outside the German western flank and the judicious strengthening of the Allied left wing. By September 4th, unless the Germans halted their advance along the Marne, regrouped their forces and devised a new strategical combination, it had become inevitable that a chance for a resumption of the offensive would present itself, before the Allied armies reached the line of the Seine, the extreme limit of retreat which Joffre had fixed.
The Miracle of the Marne belongs to the realm of fiction; but if a miracle must be found, it lies in the willingness and ability of French and British soldiers, after a series of devastating defeats and incredible hardships during two weeks of continuous retreat, to turn about and resume the offensive with a power and ferocity that amazed and confounded their pursuers. Taken as a whole, the Campaign of the Marne finds no parallel in military history, either in the size of the forces engaged, in the geographical extent of the area over which it developed or in the rapidity with which its three major phases succeeded one another. Never again in the course of the Great War did the opposing sides enjoy the same mobility and freedom of manoeuvre, nor did the stakes of ultimate victory again rest so clearly in the balance
