Should-Read: One loose end left in traditional histories of the Reagan administration is why Argentina moved in and occupied the Falkland Islands in 1982. Why didn't the fear a U.K. response supported by the U.S.'s logistical tail? Here David Drake provides an answer: the Argentine generals thought that they had been of so much assistance to the U.S. in its attacks on Nicaragua that the U.S. would stand aside--and it seems likely that policymakers like Jeane Kirkpatrick, Alexander Haig, William Casey and perhaps Zbigniew Brzezinski (if Drake has not written "1979" where he should have written "1981") had led them to believe that it would be so:
David Drake: What Distant Deeps: "Empires have generally used proxies to fight wars on their borders...
...The problem... is that the proxies have policies of their own. Not infrequently, things go wrong for the principal when the proxy decides to implement its separate policies.... In the 1970s the US hired... troops from Argentina, called them “the Contras” and employed them to fight the socialist government of Nicaragua. The military dictatorship running Argentina at the time was more than happy to support the US effort.
Unfortunately for everybody (except ultimately the Argentine people), General Galtieri and his cronies (some of whom, amazingly, were even stupider and more brutal than he was) decided that their secret help to the US meant that the US would protect them from Britain when they invaded the Falklands and subjected the islands’ English-speaking residents to what passed for government in Argentina. Galtieri was wrong–the tail didn’t wag the dog during the Falklands War–and Argentina ousted the military junta as a result of its humiliation by Britain; but there might not have been a Falklands War if the US had not used Argentina as a military proxy in Nicaragua.
I could mention cases where US proxy involvements have led to even worse results. If the shoe fits, wear it...
Jacob Heilbrun (2012): Refighting the Falklands War: "The British were and remain apoplectic about the conduct of the Reagan administration...
...particularly ... Jeane Kirkpatrick, who made no secret of her sympathies for the Argentine regime—it was a "right-wing," not a "left-wing" dictatorship... [and] the capital of the free world couldn't be too choosy about the reactionary, anti-communist dictatorships it chose to back. Kirkpatrick's behavior comes under particular censure from the British ambassador to Washington. Sir Nicholas Henderson concluded that she and State Department official Thomas Enders played an untoward role in helping to persuade the Argentine generals that that they could get away with occupying the Falklands. According to Sir Nicholas:
Comparing Kirkpatrick with Enders, it is difficult to improve on the apophthegm going the rounds of the State Department that whereas the latter is more fascist then fool, Kirkpatick is more fool than fascist. She appears to be one of America's most reliable own-goal scorers: tactless, wrong-headed, ineffective and a dubious tribute to the academic profession to which she expresses her allegiance...
Strong words. But Henderson was vindicated.... It was not Kirkpatrick's finest hour, and it is one that the British are only too glad to relive decades later.
John O'Sullivan: How the U.S. Almost Betrayed Britain in the Falklands War: "It's already a matter of record that, at first, Washington ostentatiously refused to take sides...
...The minutes of an NSC meeting on April 30, 1982.... The most striking revelation from the meeting is the degree to which Haig's compromise favored the Argentines. The minutes are quite clear on this point: Haig
then described the elements of the American plan which in effect would give ultimate sovereignty to Argentina but under evolutionary conditions which the Islanders could ultimately accept....
It's far from clear, however, that the islanders could or would accept Argentine sovereignty, nor that Haig was really solicitous of their interests. He had recently told U.S. congressmen that the principle of "self-determination" did not really apply to them. And an off-color joke of his about their sexual practices underlined his lack of sympathy....
Haig was baffled and frustrated by the reaction of the junta:
Our proposals, in fact, are a camouflaged transfer of sovereignty, and the Argentine foreign minister knows this, but the junta will not accept it.
This seemingly confirms some Brits' long-standing suspicion that the U.S. was "tilting" toward Buenos Aires throughout the war....
Haig's main supporter in the meeting was U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, usually his nemesis. More powerful players—Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Central Intelligence Agency deputy chief Bobby Inman—favored a sharper alignment on the British side.... President Reagan presided over this discussion with a kind of calm detachment. He had outlined a fairly clear U.S. position from the start of the crisis: neutrality over which country had sovereignty over the Falklands but strong opposition to settling the question by military aggression. He stuck to it.... The British... got... substantial—American endorsement of a principle that allowed Washington to give them strong material support for a military campaign that faced steep uphill odds even then. Having established this broad principle, Reagan then allowed his cabinet secretaries large leeway in interpreting it. Indeed, Weinberger and Haig left this NSC meeting with its approval of further installments both of military aid and of shuttle diplomacy.... Military aid became Washington's most significant contribution to the war...
The Iran-Contra Affairs: [Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs - ][]: "In August 1981, a CIA official met with Honduran military officials, Argentine advisers, and the FDN leadership...
...and expressed his support for the contra operations. On November 1, the Director of the CIA William Casey met with the Chief of Staff of the Argentine military; the two purportedly agreed that Argentina would oversee the contras and the United States would provide money and weapons. In late 1981, President Reagan authorized the U.S. to support the contras by giving them “money, arms, and equipment” through Argentina, with the potential for “the occasional direct involvement of the United States in supporting individual operations.” As a result, according to Kornbluh, “the frequency and destructiveness of the contra attack[s] increased rapidly.” So, too, did their numbers...
Robert Parry: Reagan and Argentina’s Dirty War: "Reagan entered into a covert alliance with the Argentine junta...
...He ordered the CIA to collaborate with Argentina’s Dirty War experts in training the Contras, who were soon rampaging through towns in northern Nicaragua, raping women and dragging local officials into public squares for executions. Some Contras also went to work in the cocaine-smuggling business. Much as he served as a pitch man for the Argentine junta, Reagan also deflected allegations of human rights violations by the Contras and various right-wing regimes in Central America, including Guatemala where another military junta was engaging in genocide against Mayan villages.
The behind-the-scenes intelligence relationship between the Argentine generals and Reagan’s CIA puffed up Argentina’s self-confidence so much that the generals felt they could not only continue repressing their own citizens but could settle an old score with Great Britain over control of the Falkland Islands, what the Argentines call the Malvinas. Even as Argentina moved to invade the islands in 1982, the Reagan administration was divided.... Reagan’s U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick joined the Argentine generals for an elegant state dinner in Washington...
