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January 2017

Reading: Stephen Broadberry (2013): Accounting for the Great Divergence

Stephen Broadberry (2013): Accounting for the Great Divergence <http://www.lse.ac.uk/economicHistory/workingPapers/2013/WP184.pdf>

European Non-Exceptionalism:

  • Nobody in 300 AD would have seen western Europe as the future.
  • Same for 800, 1100, even 1500
  • Look at regions, not nations, and what do we see?
    • Little divergences within...
    • ...and then a great divergence between the sub-continents of Eurasia

Continue reading "Reading: Stephen Broadberry (2013): Accounting for the Great Divergence" »


Reading: Robert Allen (2011): Why the Industrial Revolution Was British: Commerce, Induced Invention and the Scientific Revolution

Robert Allen Urban Laborer Real Wages since 1325

Robert C. Allen (2011): “Why the Industrial Revolution Was British: Commerce, Induced Invention and the Scientific Revolution,” Economic History Review 64, pp. 357-384. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0289.2010.00532.x/pdf

Britain's (and Holland's) Uniquely High Real Wages:

  • Why?
    • (Northwest) European marriage pattern?
    • Yeoman smallholder legacy of the Black Death?
    • Profits from British near-monopoly of international trade?
      • The British fiscal-military state
      • The (First) British Empire

Continue reading "Reading: Robert Allen (2011): Why the Industrial Revolution Was British: Commerce, Induced Invention and the Scientific Revolution" »


Reading: Michael Kremer (1993): "Population Growth and Technological Change: One Million B.C. to 1990

Cursor and 2017 02 01 Econ 210a Modern Economic Growth key

Michael Kremer (1993): "Population Growth and Technological Change: One Million B.C. to 1990", Quarterly Journal of Economics 108:3 (August), pp. 681-716 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118405

Kremer's Model: 2HABt1:

  • Malthusian population dynamics
    • A possible (eventual) demographic transition once income per capita gets high enough
  • Innovation—change in log technology—proportional to population

Continue reading "Reading: Michael Kremer (1993): "Population Growth and Technological Change: One Million B.C. to 1990" »


Procrastinating on January 31, 2017

Cursor and We re All Public Intellectuals Now The National Interest

Over at Equitable Growth: Must- and Should-Reads:

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The Enigmas of Thomas Jefferson...

Cursor and 2017 01 30 The Enigmas of Thomas Jefferson pages

Every time I start thinking about Thomas Jefferson, I get distracted by the family psychodrama—and by the plight of the Hemings family—and by the fact that TJ named one of his sons by Sally Hemings, born at the start of Jefferson's second term as president, "Madison".

I wonder what Jemmy Madison thought of that, and whether Jefferson told him personally that he had done so...

<https://www.icloud.com/pages/0wxmEkVZBXxWgMNIfB6wmFW0Q#2017-01-30_The_Enigmas_of_Thomas_Jefferson>


Hayek and the "Shut Up and Be Grateful You Were Even Born!" Argument: Hoisted from the Archives

Il Quarto Stato

Notes: Hayek and the "Shut Up and Be Grateful You Were Even Born!" Argument: Archive Entry: I have long been of the opinion that Friedrich von Hayek saw more deeply into why the market economy is so productive--the use of knowledge in society, competition as a discovery procedure, et cetera--than neoclassical economics, with its Welfare Theorems that under appropriate conditions the competitive market equilibrium (a) is Pareto-Optimal or (b) maximizes a social welfare function that is the sum of individual utilities in which each individual's weight is the inverse of their marginal utility of income.

Continue reading "Hayek and the "Shut Up and Be Grateful You Were Even Born!" Argument: Hoisted from the Archives" »


Helicopter Money: When Zero Just Isn't Low Enough: Milken Review

Cursor and Helicopter Money When Zero Just Isn t Low Enough Milken Institute Review

At Milken Review: Helicopter Money: When Zero Just Isn't Low Enough: If you pay much attention to the chattering classes — those who chatter about economics, anyway — you've probably run across the colorful term "helicopter money." At root, the concept is disarmingly simple. It's money created at the discretion of the Federal Reserve (or any central bank) that could be used to increase purchasing power in times of recession. But the controversy over helicopter money (formally, money-financed fiscal policy) is hardly straightforward... Read MOAR at Milken Review


Michael DeLong: The Spirit of Emma Lazarus--From the Dulles Airport Protests Against the #MuslimBan #RefugeeBan

Cursor and File Jan 29 14 14 16 jpeg

Emma Lazarus would be appalled. But Emma Lazarus would also be proud.

On Friday President Donald Trump signed executive orders dealing with immigration that caused this weekend to turn into chaos, and that will harm hundreds of thousands of people. He suspended all refugee admissions to the United States for 120 days, slashed the U.S. refugee quota for 2017, and barred all entry to the United States for nationals of seven countries—Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.

Continue reading "Michael DeLong: The Spirit of Emma Lazarus--From the Dulles Airport Protests Against the #MuslimBan #RefugeeBan" »


Comment of the Day: Jorgenson: Real Americans Say No to the Muslim and Refugee Ban!: "There was a wonderful post on Twitter that I can't find now that went like this:

Remember sitting in history class wondering what you would have done? What you do today is what you would have done then.

And there is this variation:

Remember in history class thinking 'If I was alive then...' Well, you're alive now. What are you doing to do?"


Reading Robert Reich (2015): Saving Capitalism: For the Many, Not the Few

Robert Reich (2015): Saving Capitalism: For the Many, Not the Few (New York: Knopf: 0385350570) http://amzn.to/29Viz6w

Can This Capitalism Be Saved?: Robert Reich in his Saving Capitalism: For the Many, Not the Few http://amzn.to/29Viz6w wants to remind us Americans of our strong record of “expanding the circle of prosperity when capitalism gets off track.” We have in our past no fewer than four times built up countervailing power to curb the ability of those controlling last generation’s wealth and this generation’s politics to tune institutions, property rights, and policy to their station.

Continue reading "Reading Robert Reich (2015): Saving Capitalism: For the Many, Not the Few" »


Reading: Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson (2016): American Amnesia: How the War on Government Led Us to Forget What Made America Prosper

Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson (2016): American Amnesia: How the War on Government Led Us to Forget What Made America Prosper (New York: Simon and Schuster: 1451667825) http://amzn.to/29ZTpPq

The Loss of Pragmatic Can-Do America: Hacker and Pierson's thesis runs exactly parallel to the thesis of Steven S. Cohen and my Concrete Economics: The Hamilton Approach to Economic Growth and Policy http://amzn.to/2a9xzfg.

Continue reading "Reading: Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson (2016): American Amnesia: How the War on Government Led Us to Forget What Made America Prosper" »


Reading: Adair Turner (2015): Between Debt and the Devil: Money, Credit, and Fixing Global Finance

Adair Turner (2015) Between Debt and the Devil: Money, Credit, and Fixing Global Finance (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 0691169640) http://amzn.to/29ZT6UM

The Devil We Sort of Know: Adair Turner's book http://amzn.to/29VqW1z has, I believe, at its core an argument that I trace to John Maynard Keynes : that we are approaching the age of the euthanasia of the rentier.

Continue reading "Reading: Adair Turner (2015): Between Debt and the Devil: Money, Credit, and Fixing Global Finance" »


Reading: Robert J. Gordon (2016): The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil War

Robert J. Gordon (2016): The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 0691147728) http://amzn.to/29VimjK

Supplementary:

Continue reading "Reading: Robert J. Gordon (2016): The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil War" »


Procrastinating on January 29, 2017

Cursor and We re All Public Intellectuals Now The National Interest

Over at Equitable Growth: Must- and Should-Reads:

Continue reading "Procrastinating on January 29, 2017" »


Reading: Barry Eichengreen (2008): Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System

Barry Eichengreen (2008): Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 0691139377) http://amzn.to/2kG1v57

Chapter 1: Introduction: Six Questions:

  1. In what sense is the international monetary system key "glue" for the cross-country global division of labor?
  2. What are "international capital markets"?
  3. What is the connection between flexibility of exchange rates and the magnitude of international capital flows?
  4. Why does the standard explanation of the development of the international monetary system—in terms of a steadily increasing tide of globalization in response to falling transport and communication costs—simply not work?
  5. Why does Eichengreen divide the period from 1850 into five different "régimes"? What themes are common across two or more of these "régimes"? What these are different?
  6. How have governments' objectives with respect to the international monetary system changed over the past nearly two hundred years?
  7. "Network externalities." What are they? Why are they important?
  8. What did Karl Polanyi write back in 1944? Why is it important? Why is it more important now than it was when Barry began working on this book in the 1990s?

Continue reading "Reading: Barry Eichengreen (2008): Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System" »


Wanted: A Readable Polanyi...

Il Quarto Stato

For almost my entire adult life--since I was a sophomore, IIRC--I have thought that the key social theorist for our age is neither Marx nor Mill nor Toqueville nor Weber nor Durkheim, but rather John Maynard Keynes. Now I think, I am slowly swinging around to thinking that the key social theorist is Karl Polanyi. The problem is that Polanyi writes so damnably badly--a fault he shares with, among others, Hyman Minsky. Just as Charlie Kindleberger is a much better Minsky than Minsky is, we need a much better Polanyi than Polanyi...

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Links for the Week of January 29, 2017

Must-Reads:


Most-Recent Should-Reads:


Most-Recent Links:

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No. NAFTA Didn't Kill American Manufacturing Employment: Afterthoughts 5

Modern Assembly Line

The biggest weasel-phrase--the biggest phrase that is not part of an argument, but rather a placeholder for the fact that I strongly believe that an argument here is needed but have not (yet) thought (my position on) it through (to my satisfaction)--is "proper nurturing of communities of engineering practice".

Going through the big Vox piece <http://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/1/24/14363148/trade-deals-nafta-wto-china-job-loss-trump> I find it in four places:

Continue reading "No. NAFTA Didn't Kill American Manufacturing Employment: Afterthoughts 5" »


Must-Read: The fact that the late still very much alive Mickey Kantor oversold the benefits from NAFTA for the United States in 1993 does not mean that it is not on balance a good thing, and does not mean that abrogating NAFTA would be a good thing. For one thing, while the relative benefits (and drawbacks!) for the U.S. are small, the benefits for Mexico are very very large indeed. To elide that is to do no good service:

Kevin Drum: NAFTA Is Really Not a Big Deal: "How big an impact did NAFTA have on the US economy?...

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Reading: Robert Allen (2011): Global Economic History: A Very Short Introduction, chapter 5

Robert Allen (2011): Global Economic History: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford), chapter 5 http://amzn.to/2iloEx6

Five Questions:

  1. Of the five great Eurasian Empires--Russia, China, Mughal India, Safavid Persia, and Ottoman Turkey--which did best at coping with the opportunities and problems opened up in the course of world history after 1500?
  2. According to Allen, none of the five were going to industrialize--that required (a) engrossing a very large share of the gains from globalization coupled with (b) cheap coal and (c) a cutting-edge engineering culture. But why were they not more successful at commercializing?
  3. What needed to happen for an empire to keep its substantial political independence in the face of the rise of Western Europe?
  4. What is "deindustrialization"?
  5. Why did Mughal India not pursue the standard 19th century model of catch-up development? Why did Czarist Russia not pursue it? Qing China? Safavid Persia? Ottoman Turkey?

Reading: Robert Allen (2011): Global Economic History: A Very Short Introduction, chapter 6

Robert Allen (2011): Global Economic History: A Very Short Introduction, chapter 6 http://amzn.to/2iloEx6

Five Questions:

  1. What does Allen mean by "the different development trajectories of North and South America run back to the colonial period and are rooted in geography and demography..."?
  2. What were the major consequences of the "discovery" of America by Europeans for the previous Amerindian populations and civilizations?
  3. Why were Mexico and Peru unable to benefit from the industrialization of Britain in the late 18th and Western Europe in the 19th century the way that the U.S. and Canada were able to benefit?
  4. Why does Allen say that "economic policy had greater impact than... institutions" in the economic success of the U.S. (and Canada)?
  5. What kept Mexico and Peru from adopting similar economic policies?

Reading: Robert Allen (2011): Global Economic History: A Very Short Introduction, chapter 7

Robert Allen (2011): Global Economic History: A Very Short Introduction, chapter 7 http://amzn.to/2iloEx6

Six Questions:

  1. What is the "short list" of candidates that are major causes for both the origins and the persistence of deep relative poverty in sub-Saharan Africa?
  2. Allen attributes a lot of early African underdevelopment to relatively low population density. What, according to Allen, kept population density low in West Africa? In East Africa? In South Africa?
  3. West Africa saw major medieval empires--Ghana, Mali, Songhay. How does their existence square with Allen's story? Why, in Allen's view, were they not or why did they not trigger the growth of what Allen calls "advanced agricultural civilizations"?
  4. East Africa had a great deal of contact with the advanced agricultural civilizations of the Indian Ocean basin for a very long time. Why, in Allen's view, did that not trigger the development of what Allen calls "advanced agricultural civilizations"?
  5. Allen thinks that Africa's poverty today was "baked in the cake" as of 1500--that the "social and economic structure of 1500... determined how the continent responded to globalization and imperialism, and those responses have kept it poor since..." Is this true? How could we find out whether this is true or not?
  6. Africa developed major exports in the late-nineteenth century--cocoa, oils, precious metals, copper and other metals, coffee, and others. After World War II Zambia was richer and more developed than Portugal. What factors, according to Allen, turned those moves toward export-oriented development that African economies undertook into a trap?

Reading: Robert Allen (2011): Global Economic History: A Very Short Introduction, chapter 8

Robert Allen (2011): Global Economic History: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford), chapter 8 http://amzn.to/2iloEx6

Five Questions:

  1. What was the "standard model" of 19th century catch-up industrialization? Which countries were able to adopt it successfully? Which were not?
  2. Why did the standard model become less and less adequate as a tool for catch-up industrialization as the 19th century gave way to the 20th?
  3. Why did the standard model not work well in Latin America?
  4. Why did the standard model not work well in Eastern Europe?
  5. Japan was the only country not rich in 1870 that, until well after World War II, could in any sense claim to have joined the rich economies of the (extended) North Atlantic as far as its state of economic development was concerned. Why was Japan unique?

Reading: Robert Allen (2011): Global Economic History: A Very Short Introduction, chapter 9

Robert Allen (2011): Global Economic History: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford), chapter 9 http://amzn.to/2iloEx6

Five Questions:

  1. Why, according to Allen, does the 19th century growth-and-convergence recipe no longer work in the 20th century?
  2. What, according to Allen, does work in the 20th century?
  3. What are the prerequisites for successful "big push industrialization"?
  4. Bear in mind that every country has at least thought about trying "big push industrialization": what has kept it from being successful in more countries?
  5. What are the holes in Allen's argument about "big push industrialization"? Is it broadly true? Is it broadly complete? How could we figure out more about how true and complete it is?

Robert Allen (2011): Global Economic History: A Very Short Introduction, Epilogue

Robert Allen (2011): Global Economic History: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford), Epilogue http://amzn.to/2iloEx6

Five Questions:

  1. Assuming that GDP per capita in the "rich" countries--what we will not be able to call the (extended) North Atlantic for much longer--continues to grow at about 2%/year, how rich will the rich be come 2050 or 2100?
  2. What other countries are likely to have joined the rich, or at least be within hailing distance?
  3. What will life be like in countries that will not have "converged"?
  4. How have countries successfully closed the gaps with the (extended) North Atlantic--in education, in capital, and in productivity--in the past?
  5. What has kept other countries from closing these gaps? What are the prospects for them closing these gaps in the future?

Reading: Guillaume Daudin et al.: Globalization 1870-1914

Guillaume Daudin et al.: Globalization 1870-1914 <http://tinyurl.com/dl20161210g>

Five Questions:

  1. In what sense was "1870 to 1914... the high water mark of 19th century "globalization?
  2. Was Gilded Age globalization--1870-1914 globalization--primarily about trade of goods, flows of capital investment, migrations of people, or the diffusion of ideas?
  3. What were the major institutional prerequisites necessary to support Gilded Age globalization?
  4. Why were these prerequisites so widespread throughout the world? Or were they?
  5. Was it sustainable, in the sense that the catastrophes started by World War I were unlucky accidents? Or did it contain within itself the seeds of a powerful backlash?

Reading: Norman Angell (1909): Europe's Optical Illusion, chapters 6-9

Norman Angell (1909): Europe's Optical Illusion, chapters 6-9 http://tinyurl.com/dl20161210i

Norman Angell's pre-World War I works are perhaps the saddest on my bookshelf. Angell explains, patiently and relentlessly, that humanity has outgrown war.

Continue reading "Reading: Norman Angell (1909): Europe's Optical Illusion, chapters 6-9" »


Reading: John Maynard Keynes (1919): The Economic Consequences of the Peace, chs. 1-2

John Maynard Keynes (1919): The Economic Consequences of the Peace, chapters 1 and 2 http://tinyurl.com/dl20161210k

To much of the industrial world—especially to those engaged in commerce, trade, and enterprise—World War I seemed impossible to imagine beforehand, and like a bad dream as it happened. The British economist John Maynard Keynes, one of those who saw the war as a previously-unimaginable horror, was afterwards to write of the pre-World War I upper-class inhabitant of London:

for whom life offered, at a low cost and with the least trouble, conveniences, comforts, and amenities beyond the compass of the richest and most powerful monarchs of other ages...

And he wrote, the upper-class Londoner saw:

Continue reading "Reading: John Maynard Keynes (1919): The Economic Consequences of the Peace, chs. 1-2" »


Reading: Vladimir Lenin (1902): What Is to Be Done?

Vladimir Lenin (1902): What Is to Be Done? http://tinyurl.com/dl20161210n

Five Questions:

  1. Millerand, Bernstein, Kautsky, and company seek to change "Social-Democracy... from a party of social revolution into a democratic party of social reform..." soft-pedaling "putting so- cialism on a scientific basis and of demonstrating its necessity and inevitability from the point of view of the materialist conception of history..." Why, in Lenin's view, is this a disastrous thing to try to do?
  2. How does Lenin hope to maintain unity of thought and goals among would-be revolutionaries?
  3. What does Lenin think is wrong with simply helping workers in their "economic struggle"?
  4. What political events, crises, and struggles does Lenin think that communists should always be ready for?
  5. What are the organizational benefits that Lenin sees as flowing from the establishment of a clandestine "all-Russia political newspaper"?

Reading: Patrick O'Brien: European Economic Development: The Contribution of the Periphery

Patrick O'Brien (1982): European Economic Development: The Contribution of the Periphery: "Throughout the early modern era connexions between economies (even within states) remained weak, tenuous, and liable to interruption...

...Except for a restricted range of examples, growth, stagnation, and decay everywhere in Western Europe can be explained mainly by reference to endogeneous forces. The "world economy", such as it was, hardly impinged. If these speculations are correct, then for the economic growth of the core, the periphery was peripheral...

O'Brien's piece is a critique of a large strand of 1970s literature about how exploitation not of internal western European populations but of people outside of Western Europe--Amerindians, mestizo and other inhabitants of the Americas, Asians, and Africans--was the driving force behind the accumulation of capital and the growth of Western Europe from 1500 well into the post-1750 Industrial Revolution era. O'Brien's point is that this argument was always innumerate: trans-oceanic trade flows were simply too small to matter in any simplistic way in which more resources flowing to the elite produce significantly faster economic development. I think his case is air-tight. If you want to draw significant causal links between trans-oceanic exploration, trade, conquest, and exploitation on the one hand and Western European growth after 1500 on the other, you need to tell a much more sophisticated and less simplistic story.

Five questions:

Continue reading "Reading: Patrick O'Brien: European Economic Development: The Contribution of the Periphery" »


Reading: Lant Pritchett (1997): Divergence, Bigtime

Lant Pritchett (1997): Divergence, Bigtime http://tinyurl.com/dl20161210e

The main purpose of Pritchett is to document "divergence." There is one group of countries--broadly, the (extended) North Atlantic--in which growth rates have been substantial and have been inversely related to GDP per capita at the start of the long twentieth century around 1870. But other countries follow a different pattern: what are now called emerging-market economies even though they started with lower incomes than North Atlantic economies have grown more slowly, making their relative position today far worse than it was 140 years ago.

Five Questions:

Lant Pritchett (1997): Divergence, Bigtime, Journal of Economic Perspectives 111:3 (Summer), pp. 3-17 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138181

Continue reading "Reading: Lant Pritchett (1997): Divergence, Bigtime" »


Reading: William Nordhaus (1996): Do Real-Output and Real-Wage Measures Capture Reality?

William Nordhaus (1996): Do Real-Output and Real-Wage Measures Capture Reality?: The History of Lighting Suggests Not http://tinyurl.com/dl20161210f

Let's go through the argument:

  • Standard measures tell us that real wages in the North Atlantic grew at an average rate of 1%/year in the 19th century and 2%/year in the 20th century.

  • But let's look at the price of light: it suggests that growth has been much faster:

  • A wax candle emits 13 lumens, a 100-watt filament bulb emits 1300 lumens.

Continue reading "Reading: William Nordhaus (1996): Do Real-Output and Real-Wage Measures Capture Reality?" »


Must-Read: It's not just "pop economics" by "pop economists". It's bad economics by senior and (formerly) well-respected economists. Why Lucas, Fama, Prescott, Cochrane, Taylor, and all the other cheerleaders for fiscal austerity have not paid a big reputational price for their astonishingly transparent and obvious analytical blunders--what David Romer called "Econ 1-level analytical blunders" still astonishes me:

Noah Smith: The Ways That Pop Economics Hurt America: "Someone needed to write a book about how economic theory has been abused in American politics...

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