Procrastinating on April 5, 2017

Yes, Neil Gorsuch Is Unfit Morally to Be Even a Night Court Judge. Why Do You Ask?

Paul Campos leads me to the water. It's the fact that Gorsuch does not acknowledge that he has even read the sources from which he borrows so heavily that makes me conclude definitively that he is unfit morally to be a judge. Saying "I didn't copy the descriptive passages, but I did write it with my secondary source open at my elbow" works only if you acknowledge that the secondary source exists, and that you used it.

From Abigail Lawlis Kuzma to Neil Gorsuch. Deletions by Gorsuch struck out. Additions by Gorsuch bolded:

The Infant Baby Doe (an appellation used to protect the family’s privacy)) case involved a child who was born in Bloomington, Indiana, on April 9, 1982, with two congenital anomalies with Down’s syndrome and reparable esophageal atresia with tracheoesophageal fistula. Down’s syndrome or “Mongolism” is an incurable chromosomal disorder that involves both a certain amount of physical deformity and an unpredictable some degree of mental retardation. Esophageal atresia with tracheoesophageal fistula indicates means that the esophageal passage from the mouth to the stomach ends in a pouch, with an abnormal connection between the trachea and the esophagus such that As a result, substances taken orally food and drink pass to the lungs instead of the stomach, eventually resulting in suffocation unless surgery is performed to correct the malformation. Corrective surgery to correct esophageal atresia with tracheoesophageal fistula is routinely performed with success, but the Bloomington Hospital is not equipped to handle the operation. However, but the parents of Infant Baby Doe refused to consent to the transfer their baby to Riley Hospital, a referral hospital in Indianapolis, Indiana, for corrective surgery.

Approximately twenty-six hours after Infant Shortly after Baby Doe was born, a hearing was held at Bloomington Hospital to determine whether the parents had a right to choose a course of treatment for their child that consisted of allowing the child to die refuse the surgery on behalf of their child. An attorney was present at the hearing to represent the child’s parents, though No attorney one was present to represent Infant Baby Doe’s potentialy adverse interests. Six physicians attended the hearing, three of whom had obstetric privileges and three of whom had pediatric privileges at Bloomington Hospital. The obstetricians “recommended that the child remain at Bloomington Hospital with full knowledge that surgery to correct tracheoesophageal fistula was not possible at Bloomington Hospital and that within a short period of time the child would succumb due to inability to receive nutriment and/or pneumonia.” The obstetrician who attended Mrs. Doe at the birth of her child “testified that, even if surgery were successful, the possibility of minimally adequate quality of life was non-existent due to the child’s severe and irreversible mental retardation.” The pediatricians three physicians with pediatric privileges who attended the hearing meanwhile stated that the appropriate treatment was to transfer the infant to Riley Hospital undertake corrective surgery immediately for corrective surgery, and one of the pediatricians testified that Down’s Syndrome children may the child might enjoy have a reasonable quality of life.

In its declaratory judgment, the court concluded that the parents of Infant Doe had the right to choose the course of treatment recommended by the obstetricians in the case, that of refusing corrective surgery and allowing the child to die. The dispute wound up in a state court where the trial judge concluded that the prents had the right to refuse corrective surgery even though their child would die. The case was unsuccessfully brought before the Indiana Supreme Court refused to hear an on an Emergency Appeal, and the child died on the sixth day after he was born while the guardian ad litem was on his way to Washington, D.C., to appeal the case to the United States Supreme Court.

Princeton's Robert George tells us about his academic practices at Princeton:

[Gorsuch] did not attempt to steal other people’s intellectual property or pass off ideas or arguments taken from other writers as his own. In no case did he seek credit for insights or analysis that had been purloined. In short, not only is there no fire, there isn’t even any smoke...

John Finnis tells us about his academic practices at Oxford:

None of the allegations has any substance or justification. Neil Gorsuch’s writing and citing was easily and well within the proper and accepted standards of scholarly research and writing in the field of study in which he and I work.

But we also have people like: