I confess, I do not understand any of these three objections: (1) Weinberg is disturbed by many-worlds just as earlier physicists were disturbed by quantum waves, but the universe does not care and does not avoid every feature that might disturb East African Plains Apes. (2) The Born rule is a problem for *all* formulations of quantum mechanics, but many-worlds has come closer to it than any other formulation and may well have derived it. (3) The non-locality of EPR, "entanglement", and "spukhafte Fernwirkung" is not a problem for many-worlds, but rather a problem for all other formulations—including instrumentalist ones—as Sidney Coleman said, it's either "quantum mechanics in your face" or non-locality; it's not "quantum mechanics in your face" *and* non-locality: **Steven Weinberg**: *The Trouble with Quantum Mechanics*: "The realist approach has a very strange implication... Hugh Everett... The vista of all these parallel histories is deeply unsettling, and like many other physicists I would prefer a single history. There is another thing that is unsatisfactory about the realist approach.... We can still talk of probabilities as the fractions of the time that various possible results are found when measurements are performed many times in any one history.... Several attempts following the realist approach have come close to deducing rules like the Born rule that we know work well experimentally, but I think without final success. The realist approach to quantum mechanics had already run into a different sort of trouble... Einstein... Podolsky and... Rosen... 'entanglement'.... Strange as it is, the entanglement entailed by quantum mechanics is actually observed experimentally. But how can something so nonlocal represent reality?...

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