George C. Herring and Richard H. Immerman (1984): "The Day We Didn't Go to War" Revisited: "Eisenhower's position is... characteristically elusive.... As early as 1951 he had entered in his diary, 'I am convinced that no military victory is possible in that kind of theater [Indochina].'... Like Dulles, he seems never to have been persuaded that the plan would work, and he was equally opposed to intervention in any form in the absence of satisfactory military and political agreements with France. In the week after Ely's departure, VULTURE was not discussed seriously at the top levels.... Eisenhower and Dulles agreed that the United States should go in only as part of a genuinely collective effort and that United States ground forces must not become bogged down in Asia...
... United Action would provide a legal basis for collective action. A multilateral effort would remove the taint of a war for colonialism and would provide additional leverage to force the French to share political and military decision making.... Eisenhower and Dulles perceived that whichever way they went they faced problems with Congress. Should they do nothing and Indochina fall, right-wing Republicans might join Democrats in condemning them for losing additional territory to Communism. If United States intervention were required, however, there would be little time for consultation and deliberation, and the experience of Korea left no doubt that intervention without some kind of congressional authorization would leave the administration politically vulnerable....
The congressmen were not swayed. 'Once the flag is committed', they warned, 'the use of land forces would surely follow'. Sharing fully the administration's distrust of France, they also insisted that the United States must not go to war for colonialism. They would only agree that if 'satisfactory commitments' could be obtained from Britain and other allies to intervene collectively and from France to 'internationalize' the war and to grant the Indochinese independence.... They made collective intervention dependent on British support and French concessions, each of which would be difficult to obtain....
Eden settled the issue on April 25.... Eden insisted that an air strike might not be decisive and added that it would be a 'great mistake' in terms of world opinion.... Churchill... told Radford on April 26 that since the British people had let India go they could not be expected to give their lives to hold Indochina for France.... The British would not be drawn into what they feared would be 'Radford's war against China'...
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