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Heavy But Inconclusive Skirmishing Between the Military Camps at Ilerda: Livelogging the Fall of the Roman Republic

spain to syria

A strongly unconventional high politician knows that his adversaries will try and convict him of crimes after he lays down his military command, so he lets the dice fly. His first probing military moves demonstrate his position is very strong. From a central position in control of the heart of the empire, he moves first to deal with the Pompeian forces in Spain to his west. He has his men build a fortified camp close enough to the Pompeian base that the soldiers will inevitably start to fraternize. Heavy but inconclusive skirmishing follows:

Gaius Julius Caesar: The Civil War: 'Heavy But Inconclusive Skirmishing Between the Military Camps: Between the town of Ilerda and the neighbouring hill where Petreius and Afranius had their camp there was a level space about five hundred yards wide and almost in the middle of this there was a small hillock. Caesar was certain that if he seized and fortified this eminence he would cut off the enemy from the town and the bridge and all the supplies which they had collected together in the town...

...With this intention, he led three legions out of camp and drew them up for battle in a suitable position; then he ordered the front line of one of the legions to advance at the double and seize the hillock. Observing this, Afranius hastily sent the cohorts guarding the front of his camp round by a shorter route to capture the position. There was fighting, but since Afranius’s men had reached the hillock first our men were beaten off and, as enemy reinforcements came up, they were forced to turn and go back to the legionary standards.

The method of fighting employed by the Pompeian troops was simply to charge violently at the outset and seize a position; they had no particular concern about keeping their ranks but fought dispersedly; if they were being worsted, they did not think shame to retreat and give ground. They had grown accustomed to this sort of fighting with the Lusitanians and other barbarian tribes—naturally, since it usually happens that troops are influenced by the habits of the natives of any region in which they have spent a long period of service.

This upset our troops, who were not at all accustomed to this sort of fighting; when they saw individuals running forward, they thought that they were going to be surrounded on the flanks, where they were exposed; and they believed that they ought to keep in their lines and should never leave the standards nor allow themselves to be dislodged from a position they had taken up, except for some very serious reason. The result was that the advance-guard were thrown into confusion and the legion posted on that wing did not stand its ground but retreated to higher ground near-by. Panic spread through almost the whole force.

Seeing this unexpected and unusual occurrence, Caesar began urging his men on, and led up the Ninth legion to support the others; he beat back the enemy, who were boldly rushing in hot pursuit of our men, and forced them in their turn to retreat and withdraw to Ilerda, under whose walls they halted. However, the men of the Ninth were carried away by their eagerness to repair the setback and, rashly pursuing the enemy’s flight too far, they found themselves in a dangerous position at the foot of the hill on which Ilerda stands.

When they tried to withdraw from this position, the enemy once again began pressing on them from above. They were on a slope, falling away steeply on both sides; the ground was just broad enough to admit three cohorts drawn up abreast; and no reinforcements could be sent up on the flanks, nor could the cavalry bring any help if they got into difficulties. Towards the town, the ground descended in a slight slope for about seven hundred yards. In this place our men attempted to rally since, carried on by their zeal, they had thoughtlessly advanced thus far; they had to fight in a position that was disadvantageous both because of its narrow confines and because it was right up against the base of the hill, so that no missile could fail to find a mark. None the less, they fought with courage and endurance, sustaining innumerable wounds.

The enemy’s numbers were increasing, and fresh cohorts were constantly being sent up from the camp through the town, so that their men could be replaced as they grew tired. Caesar was forced to do the same and send up fresh cohorts so that he could draw the weary men out. After five hours of continuous fighting, our men had used up all their missiles, and their inferiority in numbers was beginning to tell on them. They drew their swords and, charging up hill against the enemy cohorts, they cut down, a few and forced the rest to give ground.

The enemy retreated right up to the walls, and some in their panic were driven right into the town, so that the way was left open for our men to withdraw. In addition, our cavalry, although they had been posted low down on the slopes, struggled up valiantly at either side to the top, and rode up and down between the two armies giving cover for our men to retire. And so the day’s fighting was a blend of successes and reverses.

About seventy of our men fell in the first encounter, and among them was Quintus Fulginius, leading centurion of the Fourteenth legion, who had risen to this position from the ranks because of his outstanding valour; more than six hundred were wounded. Among Afranius’s troops, over two hundred ordinary soldiers were stands. When they tried to withdraw from this position, the enemy once again began pressing on them from above. They were on a slope, falling away steeply on both sides; the ground was just broad enough to admit three cohorts drawn up abreast; and no reinforcements could be sent up on the flanks, nor could the cavalry bring any help if they got into difficulties. Towards the town, the ground descended in a slight slope for about seven hundred yards. In this place our men attempted to rally since, carried on by their zeal, they had thoughtlessly advanced thus far; they had to fight in a position that was disadvantageous both because of its narrow confines and because it was right up against the base of the hill, so that no missile could fail to find a mark. None the less, they fought with courage and endurance, sustaining innumerable wounds. The enemy’s numbers were increasing, and fresh cohorts were constantly being sent up from the camp through the town, so that their men could be replaced as they grew tired. Caesar was forced to do the same and send up fresh cohorts so that he could draw the weary men out. 46. After five hours of continuous fighting, our men had used up all their missiles, and their inferiority in numbers was beginning to tell on them. They drew their swords and, charging up hill against the enemy cohorts, they cut down, a few and forced the rest to give ground. The enemy retreated right up to the walls, and some in their panic were driven right into the town, so that the way was left open for our men to withdraw. In addition, our cavalry, although they had been posted low down on the slopes, struggled up valiantly at either side to the top, and rode up and down between the two armies giving cover for our men to retire. And so the day’s fighting was a blend of successes and reverses. About seventy of our men fell in the first encounter, and among them was Quintus Fulginius, leading centurion19 of the Fourteenth legion, who had risen to this position from the ranks because of his outstanding valour; more than six hundred were wounded. Among Afranius’s troops, over two hundred ordinary soldiers were killed and five centurions, including Titus Caecilius, a senior centurion.

However, each side was of the general opinion that it had come off better in that day’s fighting.

Afranius’s men claimed the victory because, although they were generally acknowledged to be inferior, they had none the less kept fighting at close quarters for so long and withstood the onslaught of our men, and they had initially captured the hillock which had been the object of contention and had forced our men to give way at the first encounter.

Our men thought they themselves had won because, although they were on unfavourable ground and at a disadvantage in numbers, they had sustained the battle for five hours; because they had charged up-hill with drawn swords; and because they had forced their adversaries, who were actually on higher ground, to withdraw and had compelled them to take refuge in the town...

Caesar, Julius. The Civil War (Classics) (p. 57). Penguin Books Ltd. Kindle Edition.

 

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